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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A man lies on his bed, apparently unconscious.  Two policemen enter the room.  
The officers are responding after the unconscious man’s daughter called 911 to 
report he was having a seizure.  Logically enough, the officers believe they are 
responding to a medical emergency.  After all, the dispatcher told them that the man 
had suffered a seizure.  The police officers, Officers Edgell and Hesnowetz, probably 
did not know that their response to this “routine” emergency would entangle them in 
a frustrating and costly lawsuit.1  They also did not know that their actions that day 
would lead the Sixth Circuit to render yet another bewildering qualified immunity 
decision.2  
The shibboleth “No man is above the law”3 is an oft-recited maxim of American 
legal thought.  Today, that maxim plays out in § 19834 lawsuits.  These suits give 
civil remedies to plaintiffs whose constitutional rights have been violated by public 
officials carrying out their official duties.  In theory, § 1983 provides citizens with 
generous protection against having their constitutional rights violated.  Over the last 
forty years, however, the Supreme Court carved out a relatively broad common law 
qualified immunity defense to shield officials who acted reasonably, but nonetheless 
violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.5  Unfortunately, the Court’s qualified 
                                                          
 
1
 McKenna v. Edgell, 617 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 2010).  
 
2
 The Sixth Circuit’s application of the doctrine is inconsistent and at times, seemingly 
arbitrary.   See, e.g., Peete v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., 486 F.3d 217 
(6th Cir. 2007) (holding that qualified immunity defense was available to defendant 
paramedics after the restraint technique they employed as first responders to a seizure victim 
led to victim’s death because paramedics responded in a “medical emergency” capacity).  
Contra McKenna, 617 F.3d at 434 (holding that police officers responding to a 911 call for a 
seizure were not entitled to qualified immunity after they restrained a seizure victim because a 
jury decided they acted in a law enforcement capacity).  But see Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484 
(6th Cir. 2009) (holding that police officers were entitled to qualified immunity after they 
hogtied a seizure victim and put him in a jail cell, without applying or mentioning the Peete 
medical emergency-law enforcement standard).  
 
3
 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (“No man in this country is so 
high that he is above the law.  No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with 
impunity.  All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of 
the law, and are bound to obey it. . . . [E]very man who by accepting office participates in its 
functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the 
limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives.”). 
 
4
 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).  
 
5
 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-05 (2001) (holding that qualified immunity is 
available even when a constitutional violation has occurred if a reasonable official would not 
have known that his specific conduct violated the plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional 
right); Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-33 (1991) (refining further the objective 
reasonableness test for qualified immunity by establishing two-part test: (1) taking the facts in 
the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the trial judge must determine 
whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of constitutional rights under current law; and 
(2) if a constitutional violation did occur, the judge must then determine whether the 
defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time 
the violative conduct occurred); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (clarifying 
the definition of a violation of a “clearly established” law that would render the defense 
inapplicable); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that qualified 
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immunity jurisprudence has given the lower federal courts broad license to make 
divergent and confusing law when they apply the defense to specific factual 
circumstances.  Indeed, the doctrine “is in a perpetual state of crisis.”6  Nowhere is 
this more readily apparent than in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ inconsistent 
qualified immunity decisions.  McKenna, the case recounted in the vignette above, is 
the latest of these bewildering Sixth Circuit decisions dealing with qualified 
immunity’s application to police officers.  
The stakes are high.  The Sixth Circuit’s inconsistent jurisprudence threatens the 
delicate balance that the defense aims to strike between protecting citizens from 
having their constitutional rights violated on the one hand and protecting 
government officials from undue interference with their official duties on the other.7  
This Note critiques the medical emergency-law enforcement response capacity the 
Sixth Circuit has set forth to help adjudicate qualified immunity claims and suggests 
improvements the court can make to its qualified immunity jurisprudence. 
In Part II, I briefly trace the Supreme Court’s development of the doctrine and 
outline the doctrine’s policy goals.  In Part III, I develop my thesis by exploring the 
Sixth Circuit’s recent qualified immunity decisions and showing why the court’s 
analytical framework leads to inconsistent results.  Then, I argue that the Sixth 
Circuit should abandon the artificial medical emergency-law enforcement response 
capacity test it uses when police officers respond to medical emergencies.  Finally, I 
explain why qualified immunity’s policy rationales demand that if the Sixth Circuit 
does not abandon the test, it must allow judges to resolve the response capacity issue 
as a matter of law.  
Lastly, in Part IV, I explore what scholars might say about the Sixth Circuit’s 
test.  Part IV also answers critics who assert that qualified immunity is a fatally 
flawed doctrine.  I argue that qualified immunity effectively accomplishes its 
fairness and social cost reduction goals.  
                                                          
immunity applies so long as the official’s conduct “does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known”); Wood v. 
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (holding that qualified immunity applies unless the 
officer violated “clearly established” law); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) 
(establishing the common law qualified immunity defense for a police officer who executed 
an arrest warrant under a statute later declared unconstitutional, and noting that “police 
officer[s] [are] not charged with predicting the future course of constitutional law”).  
 
6
 Chaim Saiman, Interpreting Immunity, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1155, 1155 (2005).  
 
7
 Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 900 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that the 
qualified immunity defense is intended to strike a balance between allowing litigants to 
recover damages and preventing the “social costs” of such suits from unduly deterring public 
officials from dispensing their duties) (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814).  
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II.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DEFENSE 
A. The Defense’s Creation and Evolution in the Supreme Court 
The qualified immunity defense is rooted in the common law.8  Specifically, the 
Supreme Court first recognized the defense in Pierson v. Ray9. There, the Court 
rejected a §1983 claim against a police officer who arrested the plaintiff under a 
statute later declared unconstitutional.10  The defense first recognized in Pierson 
eventually became today’s qualified immunity defense.  Public officials use the 
defense to defeat § 1983 lawsuits at the summary judgment stage.  After Pierson, the 
Court modified the defense several times.11  A lengthy exposition of the policies 
behind each of these modifications is outside the scope of this Note.12  Here, it 
suffices to note that the recent Supreme Court decisions apply an objective test to 
both the officer’s conduct and the underlying legality of the conduct to determine 
whether the defense should apply.13  A brief explanation of that objective test’s 
evolution frames the problem with the Sixth Circuit’s qualified immunity 
jurisprudence.  
1. Harlow v. Fitzgerald: “Objectifying” the Defense 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald14 is the lynchpin of the modern, objective reasonableness 
test that determines if qualified immunity applies in a given situation.  The Court 
departed from earlier decisions, such as Wood v. Strickland,15 which held that there 
was both a subjective and objective component to the defense and based its 
applicability on a “good faith” standard.  In Wood, the defense would not apply if the 
officer “knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took . . . would 
violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff]”16 (the objective component) or if 
“[the officer] took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of 
                                                          
 
8
 Thomas E. O’Brien, The Paradox of Qualified Immunity: How a Mechanical 
Application of the Objective Legal Reasonableness Test Can Undermine the Goal of Qualified 
Immunity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 767, 767 (2004) (“Qualified immunity is a judicially created 
doctrine. . . .”).  
 
9
 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 
 
10
 Id. at 555 (holding that a police officer will not be liable for a false arrest when the 
arrest is made under a statute the officer reasonably believed to be valid). 
 
11
 See supra note 5 for a quick, but exhaustive list of Supreme Court precedent here.  
 
12
 See Saiman, supra note 6, at 1155-1168 for an excellent, in-depth discussion of the 
Supreme Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence; see also Michael Avery, Unreasonable 
Seizures of Unreasonable People: Defining the Totality of Circumstances Relevant to 
Assessing the Police Use of Force Against Emotionally Disturbed People, 34 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 261 (2003). 
 
13
 See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (holding that the defense is available if a 
reasonable official would not have known that his specific conduct violated the plaintiff’s 
“clearly established” constitutional right).  
 
14
 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).  
 
15
 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). 
 
16
 Id. at 322.  
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constitutional rights or other injury”17 (the subjective component).  In short, under 
Wood, a court could hold the defense inapplicable even if the officer’s conduct was 
objectively reasonable if the court found that the officer intended to deprive the 
plaintiff of her constitutional rights.  
Harlow abolished Wood’s subjective component and adopted a wholly objective 
test to determine whether the defense applied.  In Harlow, the plaintiff alleged that 
former senior aides to President Nixon violated his constitutional rights by 
conspiring to wrongfully discharge him.18  The Court held that “government officials 
performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil 
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”19  The 
Court’s holding assumed that an objective test, which eliminated any need for the 
purely factual inquiry into the officer’s subjective intent, would permit the resolution 
of many claims via summary judgment.  Resolving constitutional tort claims early 
by applying a purely objective test to official conduct would theoretically shield 
government officials and society from the potentially crippling social costs of 
excessive litigation.20  In sum, the Court noted, “[subjective] [i]nquiries of this kind 
can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government.”21  Harlow gave birth to the 
purely objective qualified immunity inquiry.  
2.  Siegert v. Gilley: Refining Harlow’s Objective Test 
Siegert v. Gilley22 clarified Harlow’s general objective test into a two-prong 
inquiry that is now the standard for assessing whether qualified immunity applies in 
a given situation.  Siegert sued his former employer, a federal hospital.  He alleged 
that his former supervisor defamed him when the supervisor responded to Siegert’s 
prospective employer’s reference request by saying that he could not recommend 
Siegert because he was “inept and unethical, perhaps the least trustworthy individual 
I have supervised. . . .”23  The supervisor asserted qualified immunity under Harlow 
and argued that he did not violate any “clearly established right” as required under 
                                                          
 
17
 Id.  
 
18
 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 802.  More specifically, the Harlow plaintiff alleged that the 
conspiracy to wrongfully discharge him was part of the infamous larger Watergate conspiracy 
that defines the Nixon presidency.  For a detailed factual account of the larger conspiracy, see 
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).  
 
19
 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (emphasis added).  
 
20
 Id. at 816-17 (“Not only are there the general costs of subjecting officials to the risks of 
trial—distraction of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary 
action, and deterrence of able people from public service.  There are special costs to 
‘subjective’ inquiries of this kind.  Immunity generally is available only to officials 
performing discretionary functions. . . . Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation therefore 
may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons, including an 
official’s professional colleagues.”).  
 
21
 Id. at 817. 
 
22
 Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991).  
 
23
 Id. at 228.  
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Harlow’s objective test.24  The District Court denied the defense, but the appeals 
court and the Supreme Court both held that the supervisor was entitled to summary 
judgment under the objective qualified immunity test.  
In Siegert, the Court crafted a two-prong test to determine whether qualified 
immunity applies.  The Court held that the applicability of qualified immunity 
necessarily involved two questions.  First, the court must take the facts in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff and determine if the plaintiff has alleged the violation 
of a clearly established constitutional right under current law.25  Second, if the 
plaintiff has indeed asserted such a violation, a court must apply Harlow to 
determine whether a reasonable official acting under the circumstances and in light 
of current law would have found the conduct in question to be reasonable.26  If the 
answer to either question is “no,” then qualified immunity applies.  Here too, the 
Court crafted its holding with a social costs rationale in mind, as it noted that 
expediently resolving meritless suits via summary judgment would spare 
government officials from the social costs of litigation.27  That much, at least, was 
nothing revolutionary for qualified immunity.  The Court’s refined test, however, 
created a new issue it would soon resolve: What is a “clearly established” law?  A 
decade passed before the Court definitively answered that question in Saucier v. 
Katz.  
3.  Saucier v. Katz: Expanding the Defense vis-à-vis the Clearly Established Law 
Standard 
In Saucier v. Katz,28 the Court added yet another wrinkle to the qualified 
immunity analysis.  Siegert’s first prong mandated that the plaintiff allege that the 
official violated a “clearly established law.”  In Saucier, a military officer shoved 
Saucier, who was protesting at an Al Gore speech, into a van because he had a 
threatening banner.  The plaintiff sued the officer, and the officer asserted qualified 
immunity.  Saucier clarified two issues that had plagued lower courts after Siegert.  
First, the lower courts were uncertain of how to analyze if a law had been 
“clearly established”: Did it fold into the general inquiry of whether the official 
violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, or was it a separate issue?  The Court 
answered the latter.  It held that courts must first determine whether the plaintiff has 
alleged a constitutional violation before even considering whether the particular 
conduct violated clearly established law.29  The plaintiff’s baldly alleging a 
                                                          
 
24
 Id. at 229. 
 
25
 Id. at 232 (“A necessary concomitant to the determination of whether the constitutional 
right asserted by a plaintiff is ‘clearly established’ at the time the defendant acted is the 
determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all.”).  
 
26
 Id.  
 
27
 Id. (“Decision of this purely legal question permits courts expeditiously to weed out 
suits which fail the test without requiring a defendant who rightly claims qualified immunity 
to engage in expensive and time consuming preparation to defend the suit on its merits.  One 
of the purposes of [qualified] immunity . . . is to spare a defendant not only unwarranted 
liability, but unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn 
out lawsuit.”). 
 
28
 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
 
29
 Id. at 201.  
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constitutional violation would not suffice to defeat summary judgment based on 
qualified immunity.  In order to defeat summary judgment under Siegert, the 
plaintiff also had to show that the officer violated “clearly established law,” which 
had been a point of significant confusion in the lower courts. 
Second, the Court clarified just how a “law” becomes “clearly established.”  
Before Saucier, many courts folded the issue into the general constitutional inquiry, 
which by nature is a fact-based inquiry.  For instance, in analyzing an excessive 
force claim under the Fourth Amendment, a court considers, among other things, 
“the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to 
the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or 
attempting to evade arrest by flight.”30  Saucier held that courts should not equate an 
affirmative finding of a constitutional violation under the circumstances with a 
finding that the law was clearly established.  To the contrary, a law will only be 
“clearly established” if there is pre-existing case law clearly announcing that the 
official’s specific conduct was illegal.31  The Court noted that the governing standard 
is “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in 
the situation he confronted.”32  The Court then went on to demonstrate how a 
“reasonable officer” could determine that the conduct he was about to engage in was 
in fact unlawful:  
It is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal 
doctrine . . . will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.  An 
officer might correctly perceive all of the relevant facts but have a 
mistaken understanding as to whether a particular amount of force is legal 
in those circumstances.  If the officer’s mistake as to what the law 
requires is reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to the [qualified] 
immunity defense.33 
In short, the Court clearly held that a law is only “clearly established” for 
purposes of defeating the defense if there is clearly analogous case law or a statute 
forbidding the officer’s precise, fact-specific conduct.34  The thrust of Saucier is a bit 
paradoxical, as an officer can be found to have acted unreasonably vis-à-vis the 
appropriate constitutional standard but still held to have acted reasonably in applying 
the relevant legal standard, or lack thereof, to the situation if there is no directly 
analogous case law on point.35  Qualified immunity applies unless the officer had 
                                                          
 
30
 Id. at 205 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). 
 
31
 Id. (“The qualified immunity inquiry, on the other hand, has a further dimension.  The 
concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to 
the legal constraints on particular police conduct.”).  
 
32
 Id. at 202. 
 
33
 Id. at 205. 
 
34
 Id.  
 
35
 Commentators criticized Saucier for establishing a seemingly illogical standard of 
“reasonable unreasonableness.”  See, e.g., David Rudovsky, Saucier v. Katz: Qualified 
Immunity as a Doctrine of Dilution of Constitutional Rights, in WE DISSENT: TALKING BACK 
TO THE REHNQUIST COURT: EIGHT CASES THAT SUBVERTED CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
172-187 (Michael Avery ed., 2009).  For an excellent argument that the Saucier standard is 
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clear notice through prior, directly analogous case law that his conduct violated the 
plaintiff’s rights.  In the end, Saucier, like the other landmark qualified immunity 
decisions that came before it, has confused the lower courts.  This Note discusses 
how the Sixth Circuit’s application of the clearly established law standard is 
inconsistent, leads to arbitrary outcomes, and undermines the goals of qualified 
immunity.36 
B.  A Delicate Balancing Act: The Defense’s Rationales 
A brief description of qualified immunity’s policy goals helps frame the issues 
with the Sixth Circuit’s qualified immunity jurisprudence.  In theory, the defense 
aims to do four things.  First, the word “qualified” in the defense means it is not an 
absolute bar to government official liability.  The defense’s limited nature ensures 
that plaintiffs will have the right to legal remedies in order to vindicate unreasonable 
violations of their constitutional rights.37  Second, the defense ensures that public 
officials will not be held liable for every single constitutional violation.38  Third, the 
defense encourages public officials to discharge their duties with zeal by quelling the 
fear that every action they take is a potential ticket to the “litigation lottery.”39  
Finally, the defense allows courts to dispose of many suits at the summary judgment 
stage, which substantially reduces the social costs of litigation on public officials.40  
This last rationale posits that constitutional tort claims should be resolved quickly 
wherever possible in order to permit the official to resume his socially valuable 
official duties.41  The Sixth Circuit’s inconsistent application of the defense 
undermines each of these policies.42  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Examples of the Sixth Circuit’s Inconsistent Qualified Immunity Jurisprudence 
McKenna v. Edgell,43 the case from the introductory vignette,44 is just the latest in 
a long line of conflicting Sixth Circuit qualified immunity jurisprudence.  The Sixth 
Circuit is not the only federal court to struggle with the doctrine.  Indeed, the 
                                                          
not in fact paradoxical, see Michael M. Rosen, Comment, A Qualified Defense: In Support of 
the Doctrine of Qualified Immunity in Excessive Force Cases, with Some Suggestions for its 
Improvement, 35 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 139, 151-56 (2005).  
 
36
 See infra Part III. 
 
37
 O’Brien, supra note 8, at 768. 
 
38
 Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of 
Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1997).  
 
39
 Id. at 3-4. 
 
40
 Id. at 4. 
 
41
 See, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (noting that courts should resolve 
the issue of qualified immunity expediently).  
 
42
 See infra Part III.B. 
 
43
 McKenna v. Edgell, 617 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 2010).  
 
44
 See supra Part I.  
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defense’s “application and administration continue to perplex courts.”45  The Sixth 
Circuit is unique, however, in its wholesale attempts to add analytical steps to the 
doctrine.  These attempts simply muddy the waters and prevent qualified immunity 
from serving its explicit policy goals.  Particularly, the Sixth Circuit exacerbates the 
problem further when it does not consistently apply its own innovations to the cases 
it decides.  If the Sixth Circuit’s inconsistent approach to qualified immunity 
continues, basic notions of justice and fairness inherent in the doctrine will fall by 
the wayside.  Examples of the Sixth Circuit’s inconsistency in action frame the 
problem.  
1.  Peete v. Nashville: The Medical Emergency-Law Enforcement “Test” 
In Peete v. Nashville,46 the decedent’s grandmother called 911 to report that her 
grandson was experiencing an epileptic seizure.47  The defendants, an assorted group 
of firefighters, paramedics, and emergency medical technicians, arrived at the scene 
and briefly discussed the decedent’s history of epilepsy with the grandmother.48  The 
defendants then approached the decedent, restrained him, and used their bodies to 
apply pressure to his neck and head, pinning the decedent in a prone position.49  
Despite their medical training, the defendants did not take any measures to ensure 
that the decedent had a clear airway.50  Within minutes, the decedent died.51  The 
District Court denied the defendants’ qualified immunity motion.52  The court held 
that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because “the rights at 
issue ‘are clearly established.’”53   
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court and granted qualified 
immunity based on a problematic bifurcated standard that cannot be found in other 
courts’ qualified immunity jurisprudence.54  The court held that qualified immunity 
would be more readily available if a given defendant responded in a medical 
emergency capacity, rather than a law enforcement capacity.55  The Court addressed 
the “clearly established” law standard, noting that “there are no cases applying the 
Fourth Amendment to paramedics coming to the aid of an unconscious individual as 
                                                          
 
45
 Chen, supra note 38, at 4. 
 
46
 Peete v. Nashville, 486 F.3d 217 (6th Cir. 2007).  
 
47
 Id. at 219-220. 
 
48
 Id. at 220. 
 
49
 Id.  
 
50
 Id.  
 
51
 Id.  
 
52
 Id.  The plaintiff also alleged two other claims: (1) failing to provide medical attention; 
and (2) failing to protect the decedent from other emergency actions.  
 
53
 Id.  
 
54
 Id. at 223.  The standard seems sensible enough, and indeed can lead to desirable 
outcomes.   The problem comes when the standard is arbitrarily applied based on a mere job 
title or when the court completely defers to a jury’s finding on what capacity the officer 
responded in.  See the discussion of McKenna v. Edgell, infra Part III.A.2. 
 
55
 Peete, 486 F.3d at 219.  
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a result of a 911 call by a family member.”56  More specifically, the court reversed 
the trial court’s holding that the defendants violated “clearly established law”: 
“[W]here the purpose is to render solicited aid in an emergency rather than to 
enforce the law . . . there is no federal case authority creating a constitutional 
liability for the [conduct] alleged in the instant case.”57  Finally, the court reasoned 
that qualified immunity applied because the defendants did not seize the decedent to 
interfere with his liberty or to enforce the law; rather, they were responding to his 
request for medical assistance.58  Here, even though the paramedics “badly botched 
the job,” qualified immunity attached because they were assisting the decedent.59  
Peete should have “clearly established” that a state actor giving medical care was 
entitled to qualified immunity.  But, McKenna shows that it established no such 
coherent principle.   
2.  McKenna v. Edgell:60 the Peete Test and the Danger of Overdeferring to the Jury 
In McKenna, the Sixth Circuit denied the defendant police officers the defense 
based on facts strikingly similar to Peete.  The defendant-officers arrived at the 
plaintiff’s home after the plaintiff’s daughter called 911 to report that her father was 
suffering a seizure.61  The daughter directed the officers to the man’s bedroom, 
where they found him lying in bed.62  From there, the factual accounts departed.  The 
daughter testified that the officers asked her if the plaintiff used drugs.  According to 
her, the officers became frustrated when McKenna protested their requests for him to 
get out of bed; they then handcuffed his wrists and ankles.63  On the other hand, the 
officers testified that McKenna was comatose when they arrived.  The officers 
testified that they roused McKenna by “placing a hand on his shoulder.”64  In 
response, McKenna became enraged and shoved the officers so hard that one of 
them fell down.65  By the officers’ account, they handcuffed him to protect 
                                                          
 
56
 Id. at 220.  
 
57
 Id. at 221 (emphasis added). 
 
58
 Id. at 222 (“They are unlike the police officers in Champion who handcuffed and 
shackled the plaintiff in order to arrest and incapacitate him.  The cases are not the same 
because the paramedics acted in order [to] provide medical aid to Becerra [the decedent].”).  
 
59
 Id. (“They were attempting to help him, although they badly botched the job according 
to the complaint.  Since Becerra was neither communicative, nor conscious and the 
paramedics were attempting to render aid, neither Green nor Champion applies.”).  
 
60
 McKenna v. Edgell, 617 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 
61
 Id. at 435. 
 
62
 Id.  
 
63
 Id. at 435-36.  It is worth noting that the daughter admitted that she was talking to one 
of the officer’s at the start of the incident and “‘couldn’t see exactly what was going on’ for 
some period.”  Id. at 435.  The majority downplayed this admission, which could have been 
crucial if they elected to review de novo the jury’s finding as to the officers’ response 
capacity.  See infra Part III.B.2.  
 
64
 Id. at 435.  
 
65
 Id. at 435-36.  
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themselves and McKenna.66  Then, the officers searched McKenna’s dresser drawer 
and medicine cabinet for possible legal or illegal drugs that had caused his 
condition.67  McKenna himself testified he had “no recollection” of his behavior 
during the seizure.68   
The Sixth Circuit applied the Peete medical emergency-law enforcement 
standard to deny the officers the qualified immunity defense.  It completely deferred 
to the trial jury’s finding that the officers acted in a law enforcement capacity even 
though 911 dispatched the officers to assist with a seizure, a medical condition.69  
The officers temporarily restrained McKenna, just as the Peete defendants did; 
however, unlike the Peete defendants, they did not pin him or use other similar 
physical force to physically harm him.  So, in a sense, the consequences of the 
officers’ actions here did not lead to the severe physical consequences seen in Peete.  
Yet, the jury concluded that the officers acted in a law enforcement capacity because 
they executed a limited search of McKenna’s top dresser drawer and medicine 
cabinet and ran his license plates because the officers “believed [they] might be 
dealing with an intoxicated person . . . or a person having a diabetic reaction.”70  
These limited actions, which presumably could be justified as reasonable by a 
medical professional responding to the same scene, sufficed to convince the Sixth 
Circuit that the jury acted within its proper discretion.  The patently unfair result here 
is all the more jarring in light of the court’s other recent qualified immunity 
decisions.  I will now discuss how the Sixth Circuit can ameliorate some of this 
unfairness and inconsistency.  
B.  What the Sixth Circuit Can Do to Craft a More Consistent Qualified Immunity 
Doctrine 
McKenna, Peete, and other cases discussed in the following section show that the 
Sixth Circuit’s attempts to add nuance to qualified immunity’s open-ended 
reasonableness standard leads to more problems than solutions.  This part of the 
Note first shows why the Sixth Circuit should abandon the Peete medical 
emergency-law enforcement test and faithfully adhere to Harlow and its progeny.  It 
then goes on to establish why strong policy reasons require the Sixth Circuit to take 
the medical emergency-law enforcement inquiry from the jury if it continues to use 
the test.  
1.  The Court Must Discard the Medical-Law Enforcement Dichotomy and Refrain 
from Making Further “Innovations” to the Doctrine 
The Sixth Circuit’s attempt to clarify the open-ended reasonableness inquiry 
through the medical emergency-law enforcement test flies in the face of Supreme 
                                                          
 
66
 Id. at 436.  
 
67
 Id.   
 
68
 Id.  
 
69
 Id. at 444.  Although the Sixth Circuit does not explicitly note that it is deferring to the 
jury, its wholesale deferral is implicit in its McKenna reasoning.  It notes, “[h]ere, as in 
Champion, ‘we are acutely aware that a jury, faced directly with the tasks we cannot 
undertake, believed the evidence presented by the Plaintiff.’”  Id. at 437-38.  
 
70
 Id. at 436.   
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Court precedent.71  The divergent results in McKenna and Peete testify to the 
problem with the test: It leads to unfair and arbitrary results that turn on the 
defendant’s job title rather than the actual purpose of the defendant’s conduct.  A 
closer look shows that Peete’s medical emergency-law enforcement test does not 
hold up to legal scrutiny.  
First, more unfair and arbitrary outcomes will result if the court continues to 
apply the standard.  Compare the result in Peete with the result in McKenna.  In 
Peete, paramedics received qualified immunity after they restrained a seizure victim 
and applied pressure to his back, causing him to die.72  Here, the court established 
the medical emergency-law enforcement test, “where the purpose is to render . . . aid 
in an emergency rather than to enforce the law . . . there is no federal case authority 
creating a constitutional liability for the negligence, deliberate indifference, and 
incompetence alleged in the instant case.”73  After Peete, a reasonable public official 
should have been able to conclude that qualified immunity attached if she acted to 
“render . . . aid in an emergency.”74  
The court proved otherwise in McKenna.  Here, police officers who responded to 
a scenario strikingly similar to Peete were denied qualified immunity based on the 
Peete test.  The officers were bewilderingly held to have acted in a law enforcement 
capacity despite their using a less severe restraint method (i.e., they did not pin the 
plaintiff as in Peete).  More crucially, the plaintiff did not die like the Peete plaintiff 
did.  The result seems extraordinarily unfair in light of other Sixth Circuit cases, like 
Everson v. Leis,75 where the defense immunized officers who hogtied a seizure 
victim and took him to a jail cell.76  Given the “fact-sensitive”77 nature of qualified 
immunity, the standard is likely to lead to more unfair results like McKenna. 
Skeptics might argue that these fairness concerns are overstated because in many 
situations, “safety nets” like a union legal defense fund or an insurance policy will 
protect officers’ personal assets from a costly judgment.78  At a basic economic level, 
                                                          
 
71
 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that qualified immunity is an inquiry into the 
reasonableness of conduct, not an inquiry into the purposes of the conduct.  See cases cited 
supra note 5. 
 
72
 Peete v. Metro. Govt. of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 486 F.3d 217, 219-20 (6th Cir. 
2007). 
 
73
 Id. at 221.  
 
74
 Id.   
 
75
 Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2009).  
 
76
 Id. at 488-89.  The Court decided Everson two years after Peete, but it curiously did not 
mention the medical emergency-law enforcement capacity standard, despite the officers’ 
responding to a 911 call for a seizure.  Furthermore, in every imaginable instance, “hogtying” 
a victim and taking him to the police station constitute more severe restrictions on the 
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights than temporarily restraining him at his home until 
medical help arrives.  The officers’ actions encompass the very definition of “law 
enforcement” under the standard: they acted “to incarcerate,” however briefly the 
incarceration actually lasted.  
 
77
 See Saiman, supra note 6, at 1184 (“the standard must be calibrated to the specific facts 
of the case”).  
 
78
 On this point, see Rosen, supra note 35, at 147-48.  
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this argument sounds rational enough.  But, it fails to account for the “secondary 
social costs” that any litigation, regardless of outcome, will impose on an officer.79  
An officer forced to endure a lengthy trial on a matter within a judge’s province 
could face higher insurance premiums, reputational damage, and job discipline, such 
as unpaid leave pending conclusion of the litigation.80  In sum, the fairness concerns 
extend beyond the “bottom line” issue of monetary liability, and indemnification 
gives the officer precious little comfort during the stressful litigation process itself.  
In fact, these additional fairness concerns likely spurred the Supreme Court to 
espouse the social costs rationale as the primary policy behind qualified immunity.81 
Second, the Sixth Circuit created the test without any support in the case law.  
Neither the Peete standard nor anything like it can be found in the other circuits or 
the Supreme Court.  To the contrary, the Supreme Court molded this common law 
doctrine to turn on objective reasonableness in light of all the relevant facts.82  It did 
not intend the inquiry to turn on one fact, such as the officer’s response capacity.  In 
Peete, the court made a leap that defied logic.  Somehow, the court reasoned that 
since there was no “clearly established law” governing paramedics’ conduct, it had 
the authority to craft a standard that does not exist in other courts’ qualified 
immunity law.83  The Sixth Circuit overstepped its authority in creating this 
“artificial distinction”84 and its qualified immunity law now conflicts with Supreme 
Court case law.  
That conflict arises because the Peete test conflicts with Saucier’s “clearly 
established law” standard.  Under Saucier, a law would only be “clearly established” 
(and qualified immunity would be denied) if “clearly analogous” case law announces 
that the officer’s conduct is illegal.85  Saucier reaffirms that qualified immunity 
inquiries must be fact-specific.86  Moreover, the inquiries must take all the relevant 
facts into account.87  The medical emergency-law enforcement capacity standard 
incorrectly shifts the focus from all the facts to a single, often murky fact: In what 
capacity did the officer respond?  This improper focus places officers in an 
insurmountable Catch-22. 
                                                          
 
79
 Id. at 148.  
 
80
 Id.  
 
81
 Chen, supra note 38, at 4.  
 
82
 For a quick survey of the relevant Supreme Court qualified immunity case law, see 
supra Part II.A.  For a more detailed summary of the doctrine’s history, see Saiman, supra 
note 6. 
 
83
 Orin Kerr, McKenna v. Edgell and Civil Liability for Police Officers Responding to 911 
Calls for Assistance, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 18, 2010, 11:45 PM), 
http://volokh.com/2010/08/18/mckenna-v-edgell-and-civil-liability-for-fourth-amendment-
violations/ (“There are no artificial categories like ‘Peete protection’ that get triggered as a 
matter of stare decisis based on dicta from a qualified immunity ruling in an earlier case.”).  
 
84
 Id.  
 
85
 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).  
 
86
 Kerr, supra note 83.  
 
87
 Id.  
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This Catch-22 prevents police officers responding to medical emergencies from 
knowing what capacity they are acting in as a matter of law.  Consider the following 
twist on McKenna.  Assume the officers respond to a 911 call for a seizure victim, 
the victim’s daughter lets them in, and they find a man unconscious on the bed.  The 
officers handcuff the man after they rouse him awake, and he shoves them.  This 
time, however, the man’s daughter tells the officers that her father is diabetic and 
that seizures tend to make him aggressive.  She tells them her father needs insulin 
and that he keeps it somewhere in his room, but she is unsure if it is in his dresser or 
medicine cabinet.  The officers then search both after restraining him, just as the 
officers in McKenna did, and find nothing.  What result will a jury reach under the 
medical emergency-law enforcement test?  Under McKenna, a reasonable jury could 
reach either conclusion.  Undoubtedly, police officers frequently encounter similar 
scenarios.  The unpredictable nature of the test suggests that any law established 
under the test will be far from clear to police officers who must make split-second 
decisions. 
That unpredictability is largely due to the Sixth Circuit’s failing to define the 
Peete test in any legally significant way.  For police officers who wish to discern just 
what law Peete and McKenna have “clearly established,” McKenna’s discussion of 
the Peete standard is circular at best.  McKenna claims that Peete does not make 
liability contingent on the official’s profession.88  But, it does not tell us what Peete 
actually stands for.  Instead, the court equivocates, “Peete may stand for the 
proposition that when a government agent acting in the role of a paramedic—any 
medical-emergency responders—commits an unreasonable search or seizure, it is not 
yet clearly established that the conduct violates the Fourth Amendment.”89  The court 
then concludes, “[T]he police officers here were not necessarily offering medical 
assistance.  Although [they] were first on the scene . . . it is not clear that trying to 
get someone out of bed and get him dressed constitutes medical assistance.”90  The 
court leaves a trained lawyer (or police officer) to ponder just what conduct might 
“clearly” constitute medical assistance.  Neither Peete nor McKenna give a coherent 
legal test that either judges or juries can apply to determine whether the official acted 
in a medical or law enforcement capacity.91  
Without a coherent legal standard, police officers making split-second decisions 
in a medical response context will be left with precious little assurance that they will 
not be held liable in certain situations.  In theory, qualified immunity ensures that 
                                                          
 
88
 McKenna v. Edgell, 617 F.3d 432, 438-439 (6th Cir. 2010) (“As a general matter, 
exposure to liability does not depend merely on the profession of the government actors.”). 
 
89
 Id. at 439.  
 
90
 Id.  
 
91
 On this point, see Kerr, supra note 83.  Also, it is difficult to say what kind of test the 
court could possibly come up with, given the variety of situations police officers encounter.  
But one can imagine some type of multi-factor test styled after other torts, with no single 
factor being dispositive.  Sample factors might include how the officer arrived at the scene, 
the extent to which reasonable officers would believe they are responding to a medical 
emergency in a similar situation, the extent of the officer’s professional training in dealing 
with a materially similar medical issue, the extent to which a reasonable officer would realize 
the conduct at issue may implicate constitutional rights, and the like.  To be sure, some type of 
substantive standard would be superior to the Sixth Circuit’s standard, which announces no 
test at all.  
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public officials can vigorously discharge their duties without fear of being civilly 
liable for reasonable errors in judgment.92  Here, the lack of a defined standard 
means that police officers responding to medical emergencies may hedge their bets 
and do the “bare minimum” in order to avoid a jury finding that they acted to enforce 
the law.  The Supreme Court did not intend this result when it framed the doctrine to 
encourage public officials to vigorously discharge their duties.93  
Worse yet, the test also leaves trained legal minds to question when the test, 
however undefined it is, will apply at all.  Everson v. Leis94 was decided between 
Peete and McKenna, but Everson did not apply the standard despite similar facts.  
Recall that in Everson police officers hogtied the epileptic plaintiff and took him into 
custody after he allegedly kicked and swung at them.  Here, the Sixth Circuit gave 
the officers qualified immunity.95  Yet, the court made no mention of the year-old 
Peete test.  Since the officers not only hogtied the man, but also jailed him, a Peete 
inquiry seemed appropriate.  Under Peete, the officers’ claim to qualified immunity 
should have been subject to stricter scrutiny under the law enforcement prong since 
they jailed the plaintiff.  Here, the court cryptically rebuts the plaintiff’s reliance on 
Peete without mentioning or applying the test.96  Instead, the court held that an Ohio 
statute codifying a standard of care for police officers responding to a medical 
emergency97 did not “clearly establish” that the officers’ conduct was forbidden.98  
One ponders how the Sixth Circuit expects its case law to guide officers in such 
situations if it does not consistently apply the test when the conduct treads the line 
between law enforcement and medical response, as it did in both McKenna and 
Everson.  
This inconsistent application of the test to medical situations similarly 
undermines the officer’s ability to respond using his best, but rudimentary medical 
judgment and training.  Professor Orin Kerr characterizes the standard as one 
implicating puzzling “constitutional metaphysics.”99  Indeed, it seems that this test 
                                                          
 
92
 See Chen, supra note 38, at 14; see also supra Part II.B.  
 
93
 See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975) (“Denying any measure of 
immunity in these circumstances ‘would contribute not to principled and fearless decision-
making but to intimidation.’”). 
 
94
 Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2009).  
 
95
 Id. at 500. 
 
96
 Id. at 499 (“Contrary to Everson’s argument on appeal, law enforcement officials are 
not necessarily precluded under federal law from arresting someone who displays symptoms 
of a known medical condition. . . .  The cases from this circuit that Everson relies upon, 
Champion and Peete, are inapposite. . . .  As for Peete, the court found that paramedics did not 
violate the right of the epileptic plaintiff to be free of unreasonable seizure by the 
government.”).  
 
97
 OHIO REV. CODE § 2305.43(A) (2010) provides:  
A law enforcement officer shall make a diligent effort to determine whether any 
disabled person he finds is an epileptic or a diabetic, or suffers from some other type 
of illness that would cause the condition.  Whenever feasible, this effort shall be made 
before the person is charged with a crime or taken to a place of detention. 
 
98
 Everson, 556 F.3d at 500.  
 
99
 Kerr, supra note 83. 
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creates more problems than it solves.  For instance, when does the standard apply?  
The Peete, Everson, and McKenna trio leave that question unanswered.  Also, what 
is the governing legal standard that decides whether the officer acted in a law 
enforcement or medical response capacity?  Again, the Sixth Circuit gives us no 
Hand formula or any remotely qualitative legal standard to evaluate the conduct.  
The test merely announces a nominal dichotomy between medical and law 
enforcement capacity.  This test gives officers little guidance in evaluating their own 
conduct.  It leaves complicated issues to wallow in the ether.   
The court’s inability to announce a coherent legal test and its failure to apply the 
nebulous standard consistently show why it is so important to follow the Supreme 
Court’s general, but fact-intensive qualified immunity inquiry.100  Qualified 
immunity’s fact-sensitive nature does not render it amenable to artificial distinctions 
like the Sixth Circuit’s medical emergency-law enforcement test.  The court should 
discard the test and return to analyzing qualified immunity on an objective 
reasonableness standard under Harlow and Saucier.  But, until it chooses to do so, 
the court’s analytical framework under the Peete test needs serious work.  
2.  If the Sixth Circuit Retains the Standard, the Officer’s Response Capacity Should 
be a Question of Law for the Court 
Qualified immunity primarily aims to resolve frivolous claims against public 
officials at summary judgment in order to prevent burdensome excessive social costs 
to both the officials and society.101  So, qualified immunity is a question of law that a 
judge typically resolves before trial.102  But, in cases like McKenna, where the 
outcome turns on disputed factual testimony, the Supreme Court’s qualified 
immunity framework requires taking the facts in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, and summary judgment is precluded.103  In these situations, the jury 
ultimately determines qualified immunity.  Here, the qualified immunity issue 
becomes a mixed question of law and fact.104  Mixed questions of law and fact are 
                                                          
 
100
 See supra Part IV. 
 
101
 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (“At the same time, however, it cannot 
be disputed seriously that claims frequently run against the innocent as well as the guilty—at a 
cost not only to the defendant officials, but to society as a whole.  These social costs include 
the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing social issues, and the 
deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office.”).  
 
102
 Chen, supra note 38, at 4; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (“On summary judgment, the judge 
appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law was 
clearly established at the time an action occurred.”).  
 
103
 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“A court 
required to rule upon qualified immunity must consider . . . this threshold question: Taken in 
the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the 
officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?”). 
 
104
 Professor Alan Chen does an excellent job describing the “continuum” that exists 
between questions of law and questions of fact:  
Rather than following a strict dichotomy, a continuum exists between “pure” 
questions of law at one extreme and questions of “historical” fact at the other.  Courts 
can resolve pure questions of law by the application of legal principles to a set of 
undisputed facts.  For example, issues involving the meaning of a particular word in a 
statute or the Constitution are legal issues.  If no disputed facts exist, the assessment 
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best thought of as lying on a continuum, with some questions lying closer to the 
legal side of the continuum and others lying closer to the factual side of the 
continuum.105  
In his seminal work on facts and summary judgment, Judge William Schwarzer 
attempts to guide courts along that continuum.  He identifies a particular type of 
mixed question of law and fact called the “ultimate fact.”106  “Ultimate facts” require 
the resolution of certain historical facts, but have a “decidedly more law-like aspect 
to them.”107  Ultimate facts are “derived by reasoning or inference from evidence, 
but, like issues of law, they incorporate legal principles . . . that give them 
independent legal significance. . . .  Ultimate facts can be more ‘factual’ (e.g., 
whether a driver . . . negligently operated an automobile), or more ‘legal’ (e.g., 
whether a defamation plaintiff is a public figure for First Amendment purposes).”108  
Ultimate facts may lie on either side of the continuum (i.e., more factual or more 
legal).109  
The determination of what side of that continuum a particular ultimate fact lies 
on is important because it serves a “functional purpose.”110  That is, if the proper 
answer mandates “‘an assessment of human behavior and expectations within the 
common experience’ of the average person,”111 then the ultimate fact is on the 
continuum’s factual side, and the jury should resolve it.  On the other hand, if the 
ultimate fact question “relate[s] to matters of law and policy and disputes involving 
technical issues,”112 then the judge should resolve it as a matter of law because 
“‘[t]he administration of the rules under which they arise benefits from consistency, 
uniformity, and predictability.’”113  In sum, trained judges, not juries, should resolve 
those ultimate facts that are more legal in nature to promote consistent outcomes in 
similar cases.114 
The ultimate fact under the medical emergency-law enforcement standard, the 
determination of what capacity the officer responded in, lies on the legal side of the 
                                                          
of whether a necessary element of a claim or defense has been met is a purely legal 
one.  In contrast, a “historical” fact is a “thing done, an action performed, or an event 
or occurrence,” such as a trigger pulled, a fist swung, or a word spoken.  The trier of 
fact has the responsibility of resolving disputes over historical facts, or concerning 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from such facts.    
Chen, supra note 38, at 88. 
 
105
 See id.  
 
106
 Id. at 89.   
 
107
 Id. 
 
108
 Id. at 89 (citing William W. Schwarzer et al., The Analysis and Decision of Summary 
Judgment Motions, 139 F.R.D. 441, 456-57 (1992)).  
 
109
 Id. 
 
110
 Id.  
 
111
 Id.  
 
112
 Id.  
 
113
 Id.  
 
114
 Id.  
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continuum and should be resolved by a judge.  The Sixth Circuit rejected this 
approach in McKenna by deferring to the jury’s verdict on appeal.115  The court drew 
a facially appealing analogy to negligence law and asserted, “juries are often asked 
to go beyond the finding of historical facts and to make objective 
characterizations.”116  It acknowledged that leaving the issue to the jury would lead 
to varied results, but noted that this result did not differ from other objective 
characterizations left to the jury (e.g., negligence).117  The majority then cautioned 
that it retained the authority to make a determination as a matter of law when “a 
reasonable jury could come to but one conclusion.”118  
This deference to the jury on the ultimate fact determination of response capacity 
fails to uphold three of qualified immunity’s explicit policy goals.   
First, under qualified immunity, basic notions of fairness mandate that public 
officials should not be held personally liable for every constitutional violation.119  
Members of the general public, who ultimately comprise the jury, tend to stigmatize 
police officers as untrustworthy, inept, or corrupt.120  The Peete standard is in its 
infancy, and any empirical data reflecting how juries will find on the medical-law 
enforcement question is lacking.  So the argument here is purely hypothetical.  The 
argument, however, is rooted in our common experience.  If the court leaves the 
medical response-law enforcement issue to the jury, juries (composed of common 
people who tend to distrust law enforcement and authority) are more likely than not 
to view police officers acting in “gray area” factual circumstances like McKenna 
with the suspicion of law enforcement.  This hypothetical scenario will potentially 
expose police officers to unfair liability in situations where a court could hold that as 
a matter of law, the police officer acted in a medical emergency capacity. 
                                                          
 
115
 McKenna v. Edgell, 617 F.3d 432, 442-43 (2010) (“Were we to determine this issue, we 
would simply be substituting our judgment about the overall character of a set of facts for that 
of the jury.”).  
 
116
 Id. at 442.  
 
117
 Id. at 443. 
 
118
 Id.  
 
119
 Chen, supra note 38, at 2.  See also Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975) 
(“Liability for damages for every action which is found subsequently to have been violative of 
. . . constitutional rights . . . would unfairly impose upon [the official] the burden of mistakes 
made in good faith in the course of exercising his discretion within the scope of his official 
duties.”).  
 
120
 See, e.g., Mary Pieper, Some Crime Victims Fear Retaliation, Distrust Police, GLOBE 
GAZETTE (Mason City, Iowa), May 27, 2010, 
http://www.globegazette.com/news/local/article_3abeda64-69e6-11df-8582-
001cc4c002e0.html; 1 Year Later: Less Crime, More Mistrust, AUSTIN NEWS, May 12, 2010, 
available at  http://www.kxan.com/dpp/news/kxan-1-yr-after-officer-involved-nathaniel-
sanders-shooting; Anne Michaud, NY Cops Biased, Crain’s Poll Finds Minorities Treated 
Differently; Overall, City Supports NYPD, CRAIN’S NEW YORK BUSINESS, Apr. 8, 2007, 
available at  http://www.charneyresearch.com/2007Apr8_Crains_NYCopsBiased.htm (noting 
that 45% of New Yorkers believe police are too aggressive); see also Rosen, supra note 35, at 
140 (noting that police officers labor under a “growing movement” of “depolicing,” where 
government decreases its support for police officers as a result of growing popular discontent 
towards police departments and their personnel”).  
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Second, that potential unfair exposure to liability could cause police officers to 
“pull their punches” and refrain from performing their duties with zeal.121  Qualified 
immunity aims to avoid precisely this result.  If an officer responding to a medical 
call knows that any potential treatment or action could lead to a jury finding he acted 
in a law enforcement capacity, he may elect to simply do the bare minimum until 
trained medical personnel arrive.  Picture Officers Edgell and Hesnowetz arriving in 
McKenna’s bedroom to find him unconscious or incapacitated.  If the officers knew 
then what they know now, that a jury will make the complex determination of their 
response capacity, perhaps they will think it more prudent to secure the scene and 
wait for properly trained medical personnel.  Instead of trying to rouse the patient, 
which can lead to aggression, the officers may avoid creating any trouble for 
themselves.  Perhaps because of this caution, the officers neglect to perform basic 
CPR, and Mr. McKenna’s airway becomes blocked.  As a result, he dies.  Qualified 
immunity discourages this type of fatal inertia.  It intends to ensure that the public is 
amply protected by officials who can zealously perform their duties without fear of 
reprisal for reasonable mistakes.  Officials will be far more likely to act in these 
“gray areas” if they know their fate is in the hands of a legally trained judge who is 
well versed in the policies underlying the law.  
Third, and most crucially, leaving the determination of the “ultimate fact” of 
response capacity to the jury undermines the dominant contemporary justification for 
qualified immunity, which is to reduce the social costs of litigation against public 
officials by allowing judges to dispose of suits at the summary judgment stage.122  
Put simply, compelling reasons support giving a judge the power to rule as a matter 
of law on the officer’s response capacity.  These compelling reasons square with 
general principles of tort law and common sense.  
Lawsuits against public officials for deprivations of constitutional rights sound in 
tort law.  Although tort law often leaves dispositive issues to the jury (e.g., whether a 
defendant was negligent),123 tort law leaves some issues to the court.  The 
determination of whether an activity is abnormally dangerous for the purposes of 
strict tort liability, for instance, is a question of law for the judge to decide.124  That 
determination is left to the court because it is “no part of the province of the jury to 
decide whether an industrial enterprise upon which the community’s prosperity 
might depend [is abnormally dangerous].”125  In other words, the judge makes the 
                                                          
 
121
 The National Association of Police Organizations asserts that the threat of a trial 
negatively impacts officers’ conduct in a grave manner.  Rosen, supra note 35, at 145 (citing 
Brief of Amicus Curiae National Ass’n of Police Organizations & National Law Enforcement 
Officers’ Rights Center, in Support of the Petitioner at 2, Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) 
(No. 99-1977)). 
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 Indeed, the Supreme Court has made the social cost reduction rationale the primary 
policy justification for qualified immunity.  See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200 (“Where the 
defendant seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on that issue should be made early in the 
proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is 
dispositive.”); see also Chen, supra note 38, at 4.  
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 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. l (1977) (“Whether the . . . 
defendant . . . has been negligent is ordinarily an issue to be left to the jury.”).  
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 Id. (“Whether the activity is an abnormally dangerous one is to be determined by the 
court. . . .”). 
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determination because she can best evaluate the policy consequences of finding a 
given activity to be abnormally dangerous.  Recall again that under Schwarzer’s 
dichotomy, a judge resolves ultimate facts implicating “matters of law and policy” in 
order to maintain predictability and consistency.126  
A judge should determine the officer’s response capacity because the issue 
implicates matters of law and policy.  No rational basis justifies allowing a jury to 
make this crucial determination in qualified immunity suits in the Sixth Circuit.  
Requiring a judge to decide whether an activity is abnormally dangerous as a matter 
of law protects important economic and public interests from sympathetic, 
overzealous juries.127  Similarly, a judge evaluating qualified immunity under facts 
that implicate the medical emergency-law enforcement standard should decide as a 
matter of law what capacity the officer responded in in order to protect the public’s 
interest in effective law enforcement.  
Judges can decide the issue based on an impartial balancing of the facts with 
qualified immunity’s policies.  Judges will better recognize the need to promote 
qualified immunity’s policies.128  Specifically, they will recognize that consistency in 
outcomes will encourage officers to do all in their power when responding to a 
medical emergency.  The judge’s superior ability to marshal precedents and legal 
concepts will promote fairness and consistency under the Peete test.  Most 
importantly, the judge’s determining the issue at the outset will decrease the social 
costs of litigation.129  On one hand, if the officers did act in a medical emergency 
capacity, summary judgment will more likely follow; on the other hand, if the 
officers are found to have acted in a law enforcement capacity, then precious 
resources and time need not be wasted at the trial on what should be a threshold 
issue. 
In McKenna, the majority’s reasons for its refusing to make the officer’s 
response capacity a matter of law fail to persuade.  First, the court asserted that 
judges do not have “any unique experience or expertise” that would make them 
superior to the jury in evaluating an officer’s response capacity.130  Granted, judges, 
like juries, lack expertise in proper medical protocol.  But, they do have superior 
legal abilities.  Those legal abilities will empower the judge to make rulings based 
on sophisticated policy considerations that a jury cannot consider.  Here again, the 
abnormally dangerous activity analogy further weakens the majority’s self-
deprecating analysis.  Judges are tasked with weighing social and scientific policy 
considerations131 against the damage that the activity is causing and asked to rule on 
the issue as a matter of law.  Judges typically do not have any special scientific or 
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 Chen, supra note 38, at 89.  
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 On this point, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. l (1977).  
 
128
 See supra Part II.B. 
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 Again, this point is most crucial because the social cost reduction rationale is now the 
dominant contemporary justification for qualified immunity.  See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 800, 814 (1982). 
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 McKenna v. Edgell, 617 F.3d 432, 442 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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 For instance, judges will consider evidence of the damage the activity causes the 
community, the usefulness of the activity to the community, the extent to which the activity is 
customarily carried out in the community, and other factors.  
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economic skills that make them better suited than the jury to weigh these factors.  
Yet, policy considerations demand a judge’s impartiality and analytical 
sophistication in order to promote consistent, sensible outcomes so that tort law does 
not overburden socially valuable activities.  
Here too, important policy considerations demand a judge’s trained reasoning to 
promote socially valuable law enforcement activity.  Indeed, judges are actually 
logically intended to deal with this issue even more so than the abnormally 
dangerous activity issue.  Suits against public officials generally arise from alleged 
deprivations of constitutional rights.  Presumably, judges are far more competent 
than the jury to apply constitutional principles and policies to a set of given facts.  
The judge’s expertise in applying the relevant constitutional principles (e.g., the 
standards for unreasonable search and seizures under the Fourth Amendment) to 
alleged constitutional violations ensures the judge will make a far more nuanced, 
objective evaluation of the officer’s conduct against the backdrop of proper 
constitutional standards.  In sum, contrary to McKenna’s assertion, judges have 
substantially superior ability to resolve the medical emergency-law enforcement 
issue as a matter of law before the case goes to trial.  
The Sixth Circuit improperly places the response capacity issue too far along the 
“factual” side of Schwarzer’s continuum.132  It gives far too much power and 
deference to the jury on a question that a judge should answer as a matter of law.  If 
the Sixth Circuit continues to apply the Peete medical emergency-law enforcement 
standard, it should apply a de novo standard of review to the officer’s response 
capacity to resolve the qualified immunity inquiry.  This standard could help ensure 
that arbitrary results, like McKenna, get overruled as a matter of law.  Judge Rogers 
took this position in his McKenna dissent.133  De novo review alone, however, is not 
enough.  In order to eliminate the problems discussed above, the Sixth Circuit should 
also guide the confused lower courts and unequivocally hold that the medical 
emergency-law enforcement issue is a question of law for the court, rather than the 
jury.  In sum, in order to preserve any fairness or logic left under the Sixth Circuit’s 
questionable test, the court must entrust judges to resolve the issue based on 
qualified immunity’s underlying policy and fairness considerations. 
IV.  IS QUALIFIED IMMUNITY THE PROBLEM? A RESPONSE TO THE DOCTRINE’S 
CRITICS134 
Scholars have roundly criticized the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity 
framework under Harlow and its progeny.135  Professor Alan Chen, a renowned critic 
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 See Schwarzer, supra note 108.  
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 McKenna, 617 F.3d at 447 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (“Here, the relevant standard 
concerns whether the officers acted as law enforcement officers or as emergency medical 
responders, and this court must therefore review the answer to this question de novo.”). 
 
134
 This section of the Note primarily focuses on the hypothetical arguments Professor Alan 
K. Chen might make in favor of the Sixth Circuit’s qualified immunity jurisprudence.  The 
arguments are purely hypothetical and should not be construed to represent Chen’s actual 
views. The arguments are hypothetical because as of this writing, Professor Chen had not 
responded to a request for comment on the Sixth Circuit developments.  
 
135
 See, e.g., Chen supra note 38; Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 
EMORY L. J. 229 (2006); Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 583 (1983).  
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of qualified immunity law, argues that the current approach is problematic because 
the defense’s main goal of resolving claims early cannot be reconciled with the 
inherently fact-intensive inquiry the defense’s framework demands.136  Indeed, Chen 
argues that qualified immunity is fundamentally incompatible with summary 
judgment, “[t]he principal, but surprisingly unrecognized, doctrinal consequence of 
the Court’s current approach is that the factual aspect has made qualified immunity 
conceptually irreconcilable with traditional summary judgment doctrine.”137  The 
ideas and critiques at the heart of Chen’s scholarship may have inspired the Sixth 
Circuit to run roughshod over the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity framework.  
This section of the Note highlights Chen’s ideas, identifies how they may have 
inspired the Sixth Circuit’s medical emergency-law enforcement standard, and 
shows why his discounting the positive effects the current doctrine has on public 
officials is flawed.  
Chen would assert that the Sixth Circuit’s medical emergency-law enforcement 
standard results from qualified immunity’s irreconcilable paradox between facts and 
summary judgment.138  He notes the upshot of this paradox, “what may be occurring 
. . . is that federal courts now view entitlement to qualified immunity not as a pure 
matter of law, but as a question of ‘ultimate fact.’”139  Chen would argue that 
because the “substantial factual component” in qualified immunity analysis has 
prohibited the lower courts from establishing a coherent analytical approach, the 
Sixth Circuit’s adding the medical emergency-law enforcement capacity wrinkle to 
its qualified immunity inquiry is unsurprising.140  Chen ultimately concludes that 
since qualified immunity and summary judgment are fundamentally incompatible, 
qualified immunity should be treated as a defense “on the merits” that should be 
asserted at trial, rather than in pre-trial motions.141  Furthermore, Chen argues that 
qualified immunity’s fact-intensive nature and open-ended reasonableness standard 
not only fail to reduce social costs associated with litigation, but they also generate 
the “secondary social costs” of litigating the defense itself at the summary judgment 
stage.142 
Given those arguments, Chen would likely endorse the Sixth Circuit’s attempt to 
distill qualified immunity into a more nuanced, fact-based inquiry.  Since the Sixth 
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 Chen, supra note 38, at 6-8. 
 
137
 Id. at 69.  See also id. at 72 (“[S]o long as it remains ‘qualified,’ or fact-dependent, 
[qualified] immunity can never be entirely successful . . . in acting as a barrier to trial or 
pretrial discovery.”).  
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  Id. at 72.  
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 Id. at 88.  For a detailed discussion of Judge Schwarzer’s “ultimate fact” regime, see 
supra Part III.B.2; see also Schwarzer, supra note 108.   
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 See Chen, supra note 38, at 79. 
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 Id. at 31.  In particular, Chen advocates the defense on the merits approach in his so-
called “I didn’t do it” situations, where the entitlement to qualified immunity turns on which 
version of the facts the jury accepts.  In other words, when the question of whether entitlement 
to qualified immunity is clearly proper or improper turns on which version of disputed facts 
the jury wishes to accept, the judge would have little or no role in making a legal judgment at 
the summary judgment stage.  
 
142
 Id. at 98-99.  
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Circuit expressly endorsed sending the medical emergency-law enforcement issue to 
the jury,143 Chen would argue that the doctrine and others like it will shift the 
qualified immunity issue to what he views as the proper place, the trial.144  Chen’s 
scholarship indicates that he would reject the policy arguments advanced in this Note 
that would encourage judges to rule on the medical response-law enforcement 
standard as a matter of law.  Indeed, he generally asserts that constitutional rights 
rarely become strict questions of law, “[t]he only context in which the issue of the 
clearly established nature of the legal rights at stake can be considered to be a pure 
question of law is when the Court truly breaks new ground and develops, in 
common-law fashion, an entirely new constitutional doctrine.”145  He would likely 
agree with the McKenna majority that if judges decided the issue, they would merely 
“substi[tute] [their] judgment about the overall character of a set of facts for that of 
the jury.”146  The Sixth Circuit, then, seems to have either been influenced by Chen’s 
ideas or to have shared his general concerns about the role of facts and the jury in 
resolving qualified immunity.147 
Chen’s and the Sixth Circuit’s arguments to support an increased role of the 
factfinder in qualified immunity analysis do not lack merit, but Chen himself 
concedes that the assertions lack empirical support.148  He also couches that 
concession by noting that arguments favoring the present doctrine also lack 
empirical support.149  Here, Chen goes too far.  Although critics and advocates alike 
lament the lack of empirical data on qualified immunity,150 empirical data exists that 
at a minimum demonstrates the need for preemptive deterrence that qualified 
immunity in its present (or a very similar) form provides.  For example, the increase 
in unsuccessful lawsuits against police officers demonstrates the growing public 
distrust towards police officers.  In 1981, California residents placed 8,686 
complaints against police, and only 18% (1,552) of those complaints were 
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 McKenna, 617 F.3d at 443.  
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 See, e.g., id. at 442 (“The law enforcement/medical-emergency responder distinction 
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 Chen, supra note 38, at 102 (“Unfortunately, this is all speculation . . . there is no 
empirical foundation for the advocates of the present qualified immunity doctrine or its 
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 See id.; see also Rosen, supra note 35, at 151 n.79.  
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sustained.151  In 2000, the trend worsened, as residents filed 23,395 complaints 
against police officers, and only 10% (2,395) of those complaints were sustained.152   
These statistics alone do not tell us much about qualified immunity’s 
effectiveness, but they do allow one to infer that restricting qualified immunity with 
artificial tests, like the Peete test, will only serve to deter litigation-weary officers 
further.  To be sure, qualified immunity in its present form is an imperfect doctrine.  
In this regard, it differs little from any other legal doctrine that produces varied 
results.  Chen might argue that the Peete test is laudable because it discourages the 
“secondary social costs” of “try[ing] the case twice” by forcing counsel to litigate the 
defense at the summary judgment stage.153  This argument, however, fails to credit 
qualified immunity’s careful balance between entitling legitimate plaintiffs to redress 
and preserving the effectiveness of law enforcement.154  
To strike this balance, qualified immunity entitles the defendant to summary 
judgment only if the judge, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, concludes no constitutional violation occurred.155  In essence, a summary 
judgment hearing on qualified immunity ends in one of three ways: (1) The 
plaintiff’s facts show that the officer’s conduct did not violate a constitutional right, 
and the case ends under Saucier’s first prong; (2) The plaintiff’s facts show that a 
constitutional violation occurred, no “clearly established law” governed the officer’s 
conduct, and the case ends under Saucier’s second prong; or (3) The disputed facts 
would either establish or refute that the officer committed a constitutional violation 
of a clearly established law, and the court will deny summary judgment.156  The 
upshot of this trio is that a “savvy plaintiff” has “every incentive to claim 
. . . exaggeratedly egregious behavior in order to clear summary judgment.”157  In 
other words, legitimate constitutional tort plaintiffs should have no trouble defeating 
summary judgment at minimal cost under the current standard.  Similarly, even 
plaintiffs with arguably frivolous claims can defeat summary judgment by pleading 
exaggerated facts or omitting facts showing the officers acted reasonably from the 
pleadings.  In either scenario, Chen’s concern that litigating the defense creates 
substantial secondary costs seems illusory, or at least exaggerated.  Chen’s lack of 
empirical evidence supports this conclusion.  In sum, Chen unfairly discounts 
qualified immunity’s deterrent effects, and his hypothetical support of the Peete test 
would not carry empirical weight.  
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Qualified immunity’s forgiving standard leaves little doubt that the Peete test is 
unnecessary, because current qualified immunity doctrine achieves its balancing 
purpose by permitting meritorious claims to go forward and prohibiting frivolous 
claims from doing so.  To be sure, qualified immunity has its shortcomings.  Even 
advocates of the current doctrine have suggested changes, like a restricted discovery 
at the motion stage to help the judge resolve factual issues bearing on the legal prong 
of the analysis.158  But, to establish a wholesale, ill-defined innovation of the doctrine 
that applies whenever an officer responds to a medical emergency opens a proverbial 
gaping wound where a small bandage would suffice.  Furthermore, if such small 
improvements are made to qualified immunity, the Sixth Circuit and other lower 
courts should wait for the Supreme Court to make them.  If the lower federal courts 
were to continue making Peete-type innovations, qualified immunity would be 
thrown into a hapless state of inconsistency in the courts.  Constitutional tort 
plaintiffs and officers alike stand to suffer significantly if the law falls into such an 
inconsistent state.  
Qualified immunity as it currently stands effectively accomplishes its goals of 
giving plaintiffs right to redress for legitimate constitutional violations, insulating 
officers from crippling liability in unfair circumstances, and ensuring that society 
and officers do not have to bear excessive social costs from frivolous litigation.  The 
complex relationship between facts and the relevant constitutional legal principles 
demand courts take steps to resolve the issue as a matter of law wherever possible.  
The current doctrine permits this outcome in many scenarios.  The Peete test and 
similar innovations, however, do not.  They take too much power away from judges 
skilled in resolving decidedly legal questions. Such a usurping threatens to 
undermine the very policies qualified immunity intends to support. 
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